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THE COMPLEXITIES OF JUDICIAL TAKINGS
D. Benjamin Barros *
INTRODUCTION
When (if ever) a judicial action can be an unconstitutional tak-
ing of private property has long been an open question in Ameri-
can constitutional law. Nested within this larger question are a
host of detailed issues concerning both substance and procedure.
Despite passing references in some cases, and a more direct dis-
cussion in one concurring opinion, the Supreme Court of the
United States-until recently-had never squarely addressed the
question of judicial takings or the detailed issues that a judicial
takings doctrine would present.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, in which the Court specifically granted
certiorari to consider a judicial takings claim against a decision
by the Florida Supreme Court,' appeared to present a vehicle for
the Court to finally resolve the judicial takings question. The opi-
nions in Stop the Beach, however, were highly fragmented, and no
position on the major issues of judicial takings commanded a ma-
jority of the Court.2 Justice Scalia wrote an opinion that consti-
tuted the unanimous opinion of the Court in rejecting the judicial
takings claim, but constituted only a plurality opinion on the im-
portant open issues.3 The plurality opinion, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, expressed strong
support for a judicial takings doctrine grounded in the Fifth
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, Harrisburg Cam-
pus. Thanks to Nestor Davidson, John Dernbach, and David Spohr, and to participants in
faculty workshops at Widener University School of Law and Lewis & Clark Law School,
for helpful comments.
1. 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 (2010).
2. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2597 (detailing the many opinions issued by various
Justices on the Court).
3. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2610-13 (majority opinion); id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at
2601-10 (plurality opinion).
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Amendment's Just Compensation Clause.4 Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote a concurrence grounded in
substantive and procedural due process,5 and Justice Breyer,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a concurrence that was non-
committal on most issues. Justice Stevens, who owns Florida
beachfront property, recused himself.7
As a result of this division among the members of the Court, all
of the major issues presented by the problem of judicial takings-
including the larger question of whether a judicial action could
ever be considered a taking-remain open. Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court's grant of certiorari, along with the strong endorse-
ment of a doctrine of judicial takings in Justice Scalia's opinion
for the plurality, are sure to bring renewed attention to what has
in the past been a relatively neglected area of law. Indeed, Justice
Scalia's opinion expressly invites property owners to bring judi-
cial takings claims in the lower federal courts challenging state
court property decisions., The federal courts, therefore, are likely
to see litigation over judicial takings claims and will have to re-
solve these controversies without any binding guidance from the
Supreme Court.
One theme of the fragmented opinions in Stop the Beach is that
the legal issues raised by judicial takings are many and complex.
I argue that judicial takings issues are even more complex than
the members of the Court suggested. In particular, I argue that
three factual distinctions-largely ignored in Stop the Beach-
could lead to dramatically divergent outcomes in matters of judi-
cial takings standards, procedures, and remedies. The first dis-
tinction is between government actions that mandate transfers of
property from a private person to the public ("private-public
transfers") and government actions that mandate transfers of
property from one private person to another ("private-private
transfers"). The second distinction is between judicial takings
claims brought by the original parties to the state court litigation
and claims brought by other similarly situated property owners.
The third distinction is between cases in which the judiciary
4. See id. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2601-10 (plurality opinion).
5. See id. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2613-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
7. Kimberly Miller, Florida Residents on Beach Lose Case, PALm BEACH POST (Fla.),
June 18, 2010, at 1A see Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2613.
8. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at , 130 S. ct. at 2609-10 (plurality opinion).
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acted unilaterally and cases in which the judiciary acted in the
context of a constitutional challenge to an underlying legislative
or executive act. I elaborate on these three distinctions and illu-
strate them with examples in Part I. I also provide in Part I a
brief introductory overview of the state of judicial takings pre-
and post-Stop the Beach.
In Part II, I consider the substantive issues that arise in judi-
cial takings cases. I first argue that the Supreme Court had no
need to settle on a judicial takings standard in Stop the Beach. In
Part II, I make three substantive arguments. First, I argue that
judicial takings does not require a substantive standard that is
different from the standards that are applied in takings cases in-
volving the legislature or executive. Second, I argue that a judi-
cial takings doctrine (and regulatory takings doctrines more gen-
erally) should apply to private-public transfers but not to private-
private transfers. Third, I argue that federal courts should defer
to state court property decisions, and that Justice Scalia's Stop
the Beach plurality opinion reflects a substantial amount of defe-
rence to the Florida Supreme Court. Finally, I consider how the
analysis might differ under the substantive due process approach
advocated by Justice Kennedy in his Stop the Beach concurrence.
Part III examines procedural and remedies issues that are pre-
sented by judicial takings scenarios. I first explore how procedur-
al due process issues can arise in judicial takings contexts. I then
examine the application of Williamson County exhaustion re-
quirements, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the statute of li-
mitations, to judicial takings cases. Finally, I discuss the reme-
dies that might be available for a judicial taking. The distinctions
between judicial takings claims brought by the losing state court
parties and claims brought by other property owners, and be-
tween unilateral judicial actions and cases involving underlying
legislative or executive acts, are both significant in these con-
texts. In Part IV, I briefly address the concern, articulated by
Justice Breyer in his Stop the Beach concurrence, that recogniz-
ing a judicial takings doctrine would result in the federal courts
becoming the appellate courts of last resort for all state court
property claims. I argue that there is little risk of a flood of litiga-
tion so long as a judicial takings doctrine is limited to public-
private transfers.
I conclude that courts considering the many open questions
presented by the judicial takings problem should be mindful of
2011] 905
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the factual and legal distinctions between different types of cases
that bring additional complexity to an already difficult area of
constitutional law.
I. BACKGROUND
In this Part, I provide a foundation for the subsequent discus-
sion. First, I elaborate on the three factual distinctions that form
the basis for many of my subsequent arguments. Second, I pro-
vide a brief overview of the state of the judicial takings doctrine
before and after Stop the Beach.
A. Three Distinctions
1. Private-Public Transfers v. Private-Private Transfers
Cases in which the challenged government action transfers
private property to the public may be distinguished from cases in
which the government action transfers private property from one
private person to another. Here are some examples of the first
type of case, which I call a private-public transfer:
A court redefines a certain area that had been private property
as public property. Beachfront property has been a focus of recent
judicial takings cases and commentary in significant part because
it involves an often-contested border between public and private
property. In all jurisdictions, at some point on the beach private
property ends and public property begins. This borderline is set
at various places in various jurisdictions, but two likely candi-
dates are the mean high tide line (i.e., the average point that the
water reaches at high tide) and the vegetation line (i.e., the point
at which vegetation starts to grow).9 On many beaches, there is
an area of sand between the mean high tide line and the vegeta-
tion line, and this part of the beach is commonly used for
recreation. Imagine that a jurisdiction had clearly established
case law that set the mean high tide line as the public-private
boundary. If the state supreme court in that jurisdiction issued
an opinion changing the boundary to the vegetation line, then the
area of beach between the mean high tide line and the vegetation
9. See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011 (West Cum. Supp. 2009).
[Vol. 45:903906
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line, which had been private, would be transferred by the judicial
decision to public ownership.
A court grants public access to what had previously been private
property. Imagine that, as in the prior example, a jurisdiction has
clear case law that establishes the mean high tide line as the pri-
vate property boundary for beachfront property, and that private
property owners have the right to exclude the public from the
area above the mean high tide line. In this scenario, however, the
state supreme court departs from prior precedent and holds that
the public must be allowed access to the area between the mean
high tide line and the vegetation line. Here, unlike the prior ex-
ample, the property remains in private hands, but it is subject to
a public right of access. The judicial action can be conceptualized
as removing part of the private property owner's right to exclude,
or as transferring an easement for public access from the private
property owner to the public. If the legislature or an executive
agency had done the same thing, this action would be a per se
taking under the Supreme Court's regulatory takings case law.1o
A court changes property law so that private property transfers
to state ownership. A property owner typically has the right to
transfer property at death. Imagine that a state supreme court
changed its existing law and held that upon a property owner's
death, certain types of property escheated to the state. This judi-
cial action would lead to the transfer of private property to the
state. If this change in the law was performed by the legislature
or an executive agency, it would be an unconstitutional taking
under the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence."
A court destroys existing-use rights in private property. Imagine
that in our hypothetical jurisdiction, the preexisting case law
clearly permitted a property owner to build on a particular type of
property. The state supreme court then issues an opinion chang-
ing the law, and as a result the property owner is no longer per-
mitted to build on the property. Whether or not this change would
constitute a taking if enacted by the legislature or an executive
agency would depend on the specific facts of the case and the idio-
syncrasies of regulatory takings law. In at least some circum-
10. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
11. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987).
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stances, such a legislatively or executively enacted change would
be a taking. 12 Regardless of whether the change is unconstitution-
al, it involves a private-to-public transfer because the use rights
that before the judicial action were in private hands no longer ex-
ist as private property. These use rights were not transferred to
another private person; rather, use rights were destroyed as pri-
vate property rights. The destruction of private property rights in
this sense is the equivalent of transferring them to the public. 3
The government could change the law to recreate these use
rights, and thereby transfer them back to the private property
owner.
The second type of case, which I call a "private-private" trans-
fer, involves a government action that transfers property from
one private person to another. Here are some examples:
* A state supreme court changes its rules on interpreting am-
biguous conveyances; as a result, person A is held to own a parcel
of property, whereas person B would have owned the parcel under
the prior law.
* A state supreme court changes its law of future interests; as
a result, person A now holds the future interest to a certain par-
cel of property, whereas under the former rule, person B would
have held the future interest to that parcel of property.
* A state supreme court changes its law on creation of ease-
ments; as a result, an easement that would have been valid under
the prior law no longer exists. The easement is effectively trans-
ferred from the person who would have been the easement holder
(person A) to the person who owns the property that would have
been subject to the easement (person B).
* The obverse of the previous scenario: a state supreme court
changes its law on creation of an easement; as a result, an ease-
ment that would not have been valid is now valid. The easement
is effectively transferred from the person whose property would
have been free of the burden of the easement to the person who
now owns the benefit of the easement.
* A state supreme court changes its rules on contracts (e.g., the
statute of frauds or the parol evidence rule); as a result, person A
12. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-29 (1992).
13. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
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loses a dispute over ownership of a parcel of property to person B;
person A would have won under the old rule.
* A state supreme court changes its interpretation of its record-
ing act; as a result, person A's interest in a parcel of property is
invalid, whereas it would have been valid under the prior law.
* A state supreme court changes its rules on adverse posses-
sion; as a result, person B owns the property whereas under the
prior rule, person A would have owned the property.
Various distinctions might be made between these scenarios;
some, for example, involve changes in substantive property law,
while others involve changes in other areas of law that affect
property ownership. For the purposes of this article, however, I
will focus on the private-private nature of the transfer that is
common to all of the scenarios.
2. Parties to the State Court Litigation v. Other Property Owners
Judicial takings challenges brought by parties to the state
court litigation may be distinguished from judicial takings chal-
lenges brought by other property owners. Consider the beachfront
property example, where the state supreme court redefined the
public-private boundary from the mean high tide line to the vege-
tation line. The property owners who were parties to the litiga-
tion could attempt to petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States, or might attempt to bring a constitutional
challenge to the state supreme court judgment in the federal dis-
trict court. Other beachfront property owners who were not par-
ties to the litigation before the state supreme court might also
bring a judicial takings challenge against the state supreme court
judgment in federal district court.
Although there may not be a difference between the substan-
tive judicial takings standard applied in these types of cases, the
distinction between cases brought by the litigants in the state su-
preme court and cases brought by other property owners looms
large when issues of procedure and remedies are considered. I
discuss these issues at length below.'1
14. See discussion infra Part HI.
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3. Underlying Legislative Acts v. Unilateral Judicial Actions
Cases where a state judiciary changes its law of property in re-
sponse to a takings challenge to a legislative or executive act may
be distinguished from cases where a state judiciary unilaterally
changes its law of property in the course of a dispute between
private litigants.
In the first type of case, the court's change in property law
would insulate the challenged legislative or executive act from a
takings challenge by holding that the property owner had no pro-
tected property interest to be taken. As an example, consider a
slight modification of the beachfront property scenario involving a
change in the public-private boundary line from the mean high
tide line to the vegetation line. In this modification, the change to
the law is not made in the first instance by the state courts, and
instead is made by the state legislature, which passes a law revis-
ing the public-private boundary line. Property owners bring a
takings challenge to this law, and in the course of this litigation,
the state judiciary interprets its case law to mean that the public-
private boundary was located at the vegetation line. As a result,
the judiciary rejects the takings claim on the grounds that the
challenged law is consistent with the state's existing property
law. In this scenario, the state court's interpretation of its prior
case law is wrong, and its holding in the takings litigation in fact
changes the state's property law. It is this judicial change in the
law that is later challenged as a judicial taking.
In the second type of case, the court changes property law in
the context of a dispute between private litigants that does not
involve a challenge to a legislative or executive act. As an exam-
ple, consider the original beachfront property scenario. In litiga-
tion between private parties (perhaps a trespass action against a
beachgoer, or a declaratory judgment action seeking public access
to the beach), the state supreme court changes the boundary be-
tween public and private property from the mean high tide line to
the vegetation line. Here, the effect of the state court's action is
the same as in the prior version of the scenario-the state's prop-
erty law is changed-but the judiciary acted entirely on its own in
making the change.
The distinction between these types of cases should not matter
for the substantive question of whether a judicial taking has oc-
[Vol. 45:903910
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curred. The distinction may have some relevance, however, when
considering procedural and remedies issues.'5
B. Judicial Takings Before and After Stop the Beach
Prior to Stop the Beach, judicial takings was a relatively ob-
scure area of law that never had received explicit consideration
from the Supreme Court of the United States. The clearest refer-
ence to a judicial takings doctrine is this passage from Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Hughes v. Washington:
Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition that the law of
real property is, under our Constitution, left to the individual States
to develop and administer. And surely Washington or any other
State is free to make changes, either legislative or judicial, in its
general rules of real property law, including the rules governing the
property rights of riparian owners. . .. To the extent that the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Washington on [the property issue in
dispute] arguably conforms to reasonable expectations, we must of
course accept it as conclusive. But to the extent that it constitutes a
sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant
precedents, no such deference would be appropriate. For a State
cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against
taking property without due process of law by the simple device of
asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never existed
at all. Whether the decision here worked an unpredictable change in
state law thus inevitably presents a federal question for the deter-
mination of this Court.'6
The Court raised by implication the idea of judicial takings in
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,17 which involved a
constitutional challenge to a state court decision declaring that
funds held in certain types of accounts became public money.'
Justice Scalia signaled an interest in judicial takings in a dissent
from the denial of certiorari in a case in 1994.1' In no case, how-
ever, had a majority of the Court explicitly adopted a judicial tak-
ings theory, nor had the Court ever granted certiorari specifically
to consider the judicial takings issue.
15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295-97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
17. 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980); see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
18. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S _,
-, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality opinion) (quoting Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam), rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)).
19. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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Judicial takings received an academic boost from the 1990 pub-
lication of Barton H. Thompson, Jr.'s landmark article Judicial
Takings,20 and the concept has received some recent attention
from other scholars.21 Judicial takings, however, has received
much less academic attention than other takings issues.
Stop the Beach inevitably will raise the judicial and academic
profile of judicial takings. Because of the lack of precedential val-
ue of the various Stop the Beach opinions, virtually every major
issue related to judicial takings-including whether it is even
possible for the judiciary to take property within the meaning of
the Just Compensation Clause-remains open as a matter of Su-
preme Court case law. Stop the Beach, however, leaves the gener-
al concept of judicial takings on stronger footing than it ever has
been before. The Court granted certiorari expressly to consider
the judicial takings issue, and all of the opinions issued by mem-
bers of the Court engage in the issue at least to some extent. Four
members of the Court have indicated strong support for a judicial
takings doctrine, and two others have suggested that some judi-
cial actions that abrogate property rights would be unconstitu-
tional on due process grounds.22 Property owners therefore have a
strong basis to bring judicial takings challenges in the federal
courts, although virtually everything about the procedural and
substantive law that will govern these challenges remains up in
the air.
20. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449
(1990). Thompson's important work did not focus on the distinction between private-public
and private-private transfers that I make above, and therefore may overstate the impact
of some early cases on the idea of judicial takings. For example, he writes that "by the end
of the New Deal, the concept of judicial takings seemed dead. Over and over, federal courts
rejected the argument that courts could take property by changing the law." Id. at 1467.
As authority for this proposition, he cites cases that involved private-private transfers. See
id. at 1467 n.76 (citing Carolina-Va. Racing Ass'n v. Cahoon, 214 F.2d 830, 831-33 (4th
Cir. 1954); Sunray Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 147 F.2d 962, 963-64 (10th Cir. 1945); Baumann v.
Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan. 1956)). I argue below that not all changes in
precedent are the same, and limit judicial takings to private-public transfers. See discus-
sion infra Part II.B.2.
21. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access
and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996); W. David Sarratt, Judicial Takings
and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487 (2004); Roderick E. Walston, The Constitu-
tion and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L.
REV. 379.
22. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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II. THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL TAKINGS
In this Part, I consider the substantive standard that would
apply to a judicial takings claim. In doing so, I presume that it is
indeed possible for a judicial action to be an unconstitutional tak-
ing. I acknowledge that this presumption avoids a theoretical is-
sue that may be the topic of some debate. There are, however, two
good reasons to make this presumption. First, as the foregoing
analysis shows, the judiciary is just as capable of taking property
as either of the other branches of government.13 Second, even
though their positions are not binding precedent, six Justices in
Stop the Beach signed on to opinions supportive of the idea that
at least some judicial changes in property law would be unconsti-
tutional: Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Thomas and Alito on takings grounds, and Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justice Sotomayor, on procedural and substantive due
process grounds. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, did
not disagree with these positions, and instead argued that there
was no need to reach these issues.24
In examining potential judicial takings standards, I first con-
sider in subpart A whether the Supreme Court needed to resolve
the judicial takings standard in deciding Stop the Beach. This is-
sue, which was the subject of some debate among the Justices,
will be important to lower federal courts considering judicial tak-
ings claims similar to those raised in Stop the Beach. I then con-
sider alternative standards for judicial takings under the Just
Compensation Clause in subpart B, and standards under Justice
Kennedy's substantive due process approach in subpart C.
A. The Supreme Court Did Not Need to Resolve the Judicial
Takings Standard in Stop the Beach
The three opinions issued by the Justices in Stop the Beach
contain a significant amount of discussion of whether the Court
23. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 1451 ("Courts have the doctrinal tools to under-
take many of the actions that legislatures and executive agencies are constitutionally
barred from pursuing under the takings protections. . . .).
24. Indeed, Justice Breyer asked a question at oral argument that suggested that he
thought at some point a judicial change in property law would be so drastic as to be un-
constitutional. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
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needed to reach the issue of the substantive takings standard ap-
plicable to judicial takings cases. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
argued that the Court needed to reach this issue;25 Justices Ken-
nedy and Breyer each argued in concurrence that the Court did
not need to reach this issue.26
On the surface, this debate might seem to be of largely academ-
ic interest, because none of the opinions issued in Stop the Beach
commanded a majority of the Court. If Justice Scalia's opinion
had commanded a majority, then whether the Court needed to
reach the issue of the substantive standard might have mattered
a great deal-if the Court did not need to reach this issue, then
Justice Scalia's discussion of the standard might be discounted as
mere dicta. Because Justice Scalia did not command a majority
for his position, his discussion of the substantive judicial takings
standard is not binding precedent, dicta or not. On further con-
sideration, however, resolving the issue of whether the Supreme
Court needed to reach the substantive standard will be critical to
lower federal courts deciding judicial takings challenges, because
those courts themselves will have to decide whether and when
they need to address the substantive judicial takings standard.
Justice Scalia's argument for the proposition that the Court
needed to resolve the substantive standard is straightforward:
the Court cannot decide whether there has been a judicial taking
until it decides what constitutes a judicial taking.27 Thus, in criti-
quing Justice Breyer's position that the Court need not reach the
issue, Justice Scalia wrote: "Justice B[reyer] cannot decide that
petitioner's claim fails without first deciding what a valid claim
would consist of."28 Justice Breyer responded by asserting that
"courts frequently find it possible to resolve cases-even those
raising constitutional questions-without specifying the precise
25. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2602-05 (plurality opinion).
26. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at
2618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2603-05 (plurality opinion). As part of his back-and-forth
with Justice Breyer on the issue of whether it was necessary to reach the standard for
judicial takings, Justice Scalia analogized "the artificial question of what would constitute
a judicial taking if there were such a thing as a judicial taking" to the "perplexing question
how much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?" Id. at _,
130 S. Ct. at 2603. The question of the woodchuck, however, is not nearly as perplexing as
Justice Scalia suggests: a woodchuck would chuck as much wood as a woodchuck could
chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood.
28. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2604.
914 [Vol. 45:903
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standard under which a party wins or loses.""9 Justice Breyer also
noted the consistent theme in the Court's prior decisions of the
importance of deciding only the narrow issue presented by a
case.30 For his part, Justice Kennedy also argued that it was a bad
idea for the Court to reach out and decide issues that it need not
reach before those issues had been considered in the lower courts
and by commentators. 31
Justices Breyer and Kennedy have the better argument. Jus-
tice Scalia, of course, was correct that a court needs to have at
least some idea of the applicable substantive standard before it
resolves a party's claim. But Justice Breyer was also correct that
in some cases a court need not resolve the specific standard before
it rejects a claim. Consider a common law court deciding for the
first time whether to recognize a doctrine of felony murder in a
case where it turns out the victim is still alive. The court would
be entirely correct to decide the case without resolving the specif-
ic felony murder standard, because on any conceivable analysis, a
murder prosecution requires the victim to be dead. Although the
law on judicial takings is still wide open, everyone would agree
that to state a judicial takings claim, a property owner would
have to demonstrate that a state court judicial action was a de-
parture from, or inconsistent with, the prior property law in that
jurisdiction. If a state court holding is consistent with the state's
prior property law, then nothing has been taken from the proper-
ty owner. Alternatively, this same point can be made in terms of a
comparison to takings by the legislature or the executive branch.
Under no theory of judicial takings could a judicial action be a
taking if it would not be a taking for the legislature or the execu-
tive branch to do the same thing. A legislative or executive action
is not a taking if it is consistent with the state's background prin-
ciples of property law.32 For a takings claim to be made, the prop-
29. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring).
30. See id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (quoting Whitehouse v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 349 U.S.
366, 373 (1955)).
31. See id. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2617-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). Justice Scalia's
opinion for the plurality in Stop the Beach can be read as a shot across the bows of state
courts that might be tempted to misuse the background principles exception to protect the
state from takings liability. If there was no precedential support for the state court's use of
the background principles exception, then the state court decision itself might constitute a
judicial taking. Quoting Lucas, Justice Scalia wrote,
[A] regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial
use of his property is not a taking if the restriction "inhere[s] in the title it-
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erty owner must establish that something was taken. In Stop the
Beach, the Court unanimously concluded that the Florida Su-
preme Court's holding was consistent with the prior Florida law
on beachfront property.33 Under no conceivable standard, then,
could the Florida Supreme Court's holding be a judicial taking,
and the Supreme Court of the United States therefore did not
need to reach the specific substantive standard for judicial tak-
ings to reject the petitioner's claims.
Justices Kennedy and Breyer were also correct to argue that it
is unwise to reach an issue if it is unnecessary to do so. An over-
arching theme of this article is that the issues presented by judi-
cial takings are far more complex than the Court's opinions in
Stop the Beach (including those by Justices Kennedy and Breyer)
might suggest. Had the Court finally resolved any of these issues
in Stop the Beach without recognizing their complexity, it might
have created more problems than it solved.
Lower federal courts considering judicial takings claims would
therefore be wise to resolve only the narrow issues presented by
any particular case. Under any conceivable theory of judicial tak-
ings, a judicial taking can only occur if the challenged state court
holding is inconsistent with the state's prior property law. If a
court concludes that the challenged state court holding is consis-
tent with the prior law in that state, then the court should reject
the judicial takings claim without reaching the issue of the specif-
ic judicial takings standard.
B. When Should a Judicial Action Be Considered a Taking Under
the Just Compensation Clause?
In this section, I consider the substantive issue of when a judi-
cial action should be understood to constitute a taking in violation
of the Just Compensation Clause. I first argue that there is no
self, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of prop-
erty and nuisance already place upon land ownership." A constitutional pro-
vision that forbids the uncompensated taking of property is quite simply in-
susceptible of enforcement by federal courts unless they have the power to
decide what property rights exist under state law.
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1029); see also id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (majority opinion) ('The Florida Su-
preme Court decision before us is consistent with these background principles of state
property law.").
33. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (majority opinion).
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need for a unique judicial takings standard and that a judicial ac-
tion should be a taking if the equivalent action performed by the
legislature or executive branch would also be a taking. I then ar-
gue that the takings doctrine under the Just Compensation
Clause-whether judicial or otherwise-should only include pri-
vate-public transfers, and not private-private transfers. Finally, I
consider the degree of deference that a reviewing federal court
should give to contested state court property decisions.
1. There Is No Need for a Unique Judicial Takings Standard
The logic of judicial takings rests on two basic points. First, the
judiciary is a state actor, and is subject to the Constitution.4
Second, the judiciary is capable of taking property.35 The first
point seems incontrovertible, and the examples of judicially man-
dated private-public transfers discussed above demonstrate that
the second is true as well. As Justice Scalia argued in his Stop the
Beach plurality opinion, "[t]he Takings Clause bars the State from
taking private property without paying for it, no matter which
branch is the instrument of the taking."36
On this logic, there is no need for a unique test for judicial tak-
ings. A judicial action should be considered a taking under the
Just Compensation Clause if the equivalent action would be a
taking if performed by the legislature or the executive branch.
The prototypical judicial takings fact pattern involves a change
in property law by a state judiciary. Although this fact pattern
may appear to be superficially different from the standard regula-
tory takings case, it in fact fits very well into the structure of the
Court's existing regulatory takings jurisprudence. The Court has
considered takings challenges to legislative changes to property
law that are similar to changes that might be made by the judi-
ciary. In Hodel v. Irving, for example, the Court held that a legis-
lative change to rules relating to the transfer of property at death
was an unconstitutional taking.37 It is important to note, as I will
discuss further below, that Hodel involved a private-public trans-
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
35. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 1451 ("Courts have the doctrinal tools to under-
take many of the actions that legislatures and executive agencies are constitutionally
barred from pursuing under the takings protections. . . .").
36. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at-, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
37. 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987).
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fer-the change in law resulted in the property interests in ques-
tion escheating to the state at death, rather than transferring to
another private person.38 For now, it is sufficient to recognize that
it is easy to imagine a state court making the type of change in
law that the legislature made in Hodel. It is similarly easy to im-
agine state court decisions making other types of changes to the
law that would fit into other branches of the Court's regulatory
takings case law. The private-public transfer scenarios discussed
above provided examples of judicial alterations of use rights in
property that could easily be analyzed under cases such as Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City" and Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council," and of judicial requirements of public
access to private property that are similar to those at issue in
cases like Kaiser Aetna v. United States41 and Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission.42
There can be little question that a legislative or executive ac-
tion simply declaring that previously recognized property rights
no longer existed would be a regulatory taking under the Court's
existing takings jurisprudence. The dominant theme of the
Court's most recent regulatory takings cases is that a government
action is a taking if it is the equivalent of an exercise of eminent
domain,43 and Justice Scalia's Stop the Beach plurality opinion
prominently featured his principle of equivalence.44 The declara-
tion that a property right no longer exists is certainly the equiva-
lent of the taking of that property right through eminent domain.
Prior to each government action, owners held private property
rights; after each, the public held those rights.45 Thus, as Justice
Scalia argued in Stop the Beach, "[i]f a legislature or a court dec-
lares that what was once an established right of private property
no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the
38. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
39. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
40. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
41. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
42. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
43. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) ("Although our regulatory
takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified, these three inquiries (reflected
in Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central) share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify
regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which govern-
ment directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.").
44. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. ,
-, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010) (plurality opinion).
45. See id. at 130 S. Ct. at 2602.
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State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by
regulation."41 In his opinion, Justice Scalia placed his emphasis on
"or a court."47 Here, I would place the emphasis on "a legislature."
The branches of government are equivalent in this context, and
there is no need to create a unique standard for judicial takings.
2. The Just Compensation Clause Should Apply to Private-Public
Transfers, but Not to Private-Private Transfers
My argument that the Just Compensation Clause should apply
to private-public transfers, but not to private-private transfers,
has three parts. First, private-private transfers do not "destroy"
or "take" property in the same sense as private-public transfers.
Second, there is scant support in the Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence for applying the Just Compensation Clause to pri-
vate-private transfers. Third, there is no support in Justice Sca-
lia's Stop the Beach plurality opinion for including private-private
transfers within a judicial takings doctrine.
a. Private-Private Transfers Neither "Destroy" Nor "Take"
Property in the Same Sense As Private-Public Transfers
Recall the examples of private-private transfers discussed in
Part I.A.1. 4 8 Some of these scenarios involve what fairly could be
termed the destruction of a private property right. The example
involving a change in future interests law, for example, might in-
volve the invalidity of an interest that would otherwise have been
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. I discussed the private-public v. private-private distinction in a blog post written
just after certiorari was granted in Stop the Beach. D. Benjamin Barros, What's At Stake
in Stop the Beach Renourishment, PROPERTYPROF BLOG (July 1, 2009), http://lawprofes
sors.typepad.com/property/2009/07/whats-at-stake-in-stop-the-beach-renourishment.html.
Lior Strahilevitz, responding to a hypothetical by Jerry Anderson, had some very though-
tful comments on the subject after the opinion in Stop the Beach was issued. See Lior
Strahilevitz, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Kelo, and the Future of Judicial Takings, U.
CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (June 17, 2010, 3:32 PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/
2010/06/stop-the-beach-renourishment-kelo-and-the-future-of-judicial-takings.html#tp.
Eduardo Pefialver also had some very thoughtful comments. See Eduardo Pefialver, Judi-
cial Takings, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 22, 2010, 2:56 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/pra
wfsblawg/2010/06/judicial-takings.html. The distinction made here also bears a slight re-
semblance to Joseph Sax's distinction between government acting as enterpriser and gov-
ernment acting as mediator between conflicting private claims. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1964).
2011] 919
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
valid. It is not a stretch to call this change a destruction of the fu-
ture interest in question. So, too, with the example of the ease-
ment that otherwise would have been valid under the prior law;
the change in law can fairly be termed a destruction of the ease-
ment.
These two examples, however, do not involve the destruction of
a property right in the sense that it was used to describe the ex-
amples involving private-public transfers. In the private-public
transfers, the private property right was destroyed as an interest
in private property; those rights are no longer held by any private
person and are public, not private, property. In the private-
private examples involving the future interest and the easement,
in contrast, the interests are best conceptualized as being trans-
ferred to another private person, rather than as being destroyed
outright as private property interests.
This distinction can be illustrated by comparing the easement-
destruction example and the beachfront land example involving
judicial redefinition of the public-private boundary line. If the
easement is destroyed, the property interests represented by the
easement effectively transfer from the person who would have
been the holder of the benefit of the easement (person A) to the
holder of the property that would have been burdened by the
easement (person B). Person B could later grant those interests to
person A or another person. That is, person B could recreate the
destroyed easement. In the beachfront land example, in contrast,
no private property owner could recreate the destroyed property
interests. In the first beachfront example, the state supreme
court moved the boundary between public and private property
from the mean high tide line to the vegetation line. This action
destroyed the private property between the mean high tide line
and the vegetation line. The private property interests at issue no
longer exist-no private person could recreate them under any
circumstance. Rather, these interests have become public proper-
ty. The public, of course, could act through a government entity to
recreate the destroyed private property interests-for example,
by legislatively granting the land at issue to a private person. The
private-public transfer involved in this example, however, truly
destroys private property in that the property interest is no long-
er private, while the private-private transfer at issue in the
easement example preserves the interests as private property, al-
beit in a different private owner.
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Similarly, a private-public transfer "takes" property in a way
that a private-private transfer does not. It is natural to read the
word "taken" in the Just Compensation Clause as applying to
those circumstances where the government action transfers the
property interest from a private person to the government. The
development of the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence
shows a consistent recognition that the government can take
property in this sense without an exercise of eminent domain.4
The foregoing discussion of the beachfront property scenario de-
monstrates that property can be taken through judicial action
just as it can be taken by regulation-the effect on the property
owner in the version of the scenario involving an underlying legis-
lative action is the same as it is in the version where the judiciary
acts on its own.
In a private-private transfer, in contrast, the government ac-
tion does not take property in the same way. To be sure, it does
not do violence to the word "take" to say that the examples of the
private-private transfers discussed above take property from one
person and transfer it to another. There is good reason, however,
to focus on both ends of the transaction in interpreting the Just
Compensation Clause. The historical evidence suggests that the
Just Compensation Clause was inspired by private-public trans-
fers,50 and the Supreme Court's recent regulatory takings juri-
sprudence has increasingly focused on the equivalence of the con-
tested regulatory act to an exercise of eminent domain." By its
nature, eminent domain involves a private-public transfer. It is
true-at least under the Supreme Court's case law-that the gov-
ernment is able to transfer private property taken by eminent
domain to another private party.52 Even here, however, the trans-
fer would be private-public-private, rather than simply private-
private. That is, even when eminent domain is used to transfer
property from one private person to another, there is an interven-
ing period of government ownership.
49. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-
78 (1871).
50. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 828-32 (1995).
51. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at-, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion); Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
52. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005); Haw. Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
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Even if private-private transfers do not "take" property from an
owner in the sense used here, they do "deprive" the owner of
property. At the beginning of the transfer, the private person
owned certain property. At the end of the transfer, he or she did
not. Following the text of the Fifth Amendment,5 3 this distinction
between "take" and "deprive" suggests that there is a textual ba-
sis to apply the Just Compensation Clause to private-public
transfers, but not to private-private transfers. The relevant por-
tion of the Fifth Amendment reads: "No person shall . . . be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation."5 4 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment echoes the language of the Fifth Amendment: "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."66 Focusing on both the front and back ends of
the transfer provides a natural demarcation of which types of
transfers are subject to the Just Compensation Clause and the
Due Process Clause. Both private-public and private-private
transfers imposed by a government actor "deprive" owners of pri-
vate property and are subject to the requirements of the Due
Process Clause. Only private-public transfers, in contrast, "take"
property and are subject to the requirements of the Just Compen-
sation Clause.
b. There Is Little Support in the Court's Contemporary
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence for the Application of the
Just Compensation Clause to Private-Private Transfers
The Supreme Court's regulatory takings case law has largely
involved challenges to government actions that result in private-
public transfers. The regulatory takings case that most resembles
the prototypical judicial takings scenario of a change in substan-
tive property law is Hodel, which involved a legislative alteration
of an owner's power to transfer certain types of property at
53. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. amend. XIV (emphasis added). The Just Compensation Clause is applied to the
states through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Chi.,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234 (1897). Takings cases involving
challenges to state laws therefore routinely refer to the Fourteenth Amendment, even if
they are not applying procedural or substantive due process concepts rooted in the Due
Process Clause.
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death.56 The legislation at issue, however, changed the law so that
at the owner's death, the property at issue would escheat to the
State, rather than transfer to another private person.57 The legis-
lative change thus created a private-public transfer, rather than
a private-private transfer. Similarly, Webb's Fabulous Pharma-
cies,", which features prominently in discussions of judicial tak-
ings,'59 involved a court holding that certain private funds had be-
come "'public money.'"6o
The land-use regulation cases that are at the core of the Court's
contemporary regulatory takings jurisprudence also involve pri-
vate-public transfers. As discussed above, land-use restrictions
transfer the use rights at issue from the affected private property
owners to the public. 6 1 In Lucas, for example, South Carolina's
Beachfront Management Act prohibited David Lucas (or any oth-
er owner of the subject property) from building on two parcels of
beachfront property that he owned.6 2 The use rights that Lucas
had previously held were therefore transferred to the public. Si-
milarly, in Penn Central, the owners of Grand Central Terminal
claimed that New York's Landmarks Preservation Law prevented
them from building in the air space above the terminal.6 1 The Su-
preme Court rejected this takings claim, but the property owner's
theory was that the government had transferred" its claimed use
rights from the owner to the public.65
The early regulatory takings case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon involved, at least in part, a private-private transfer.6
Pennsylvania's Kohler Act prohibited the mining of coal beneath
inhabited structures unless the owner of the coal also owned the
56. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 709 (1987).
57. Id. (quoting Indian Land Consolidation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-459, § 207, 96 Stat.
2515, 2519 (1983) (repealed 2000)).
58. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
59. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. _,
-, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc., 374 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam), rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)).
61. See discussion supra Part I.A. 1.
62. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007 (1992).
63. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1978).
64. Id. at 138.
65. Id. at 122.
66. See 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922).
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structure.6 1 In circumstances where the owner of the coal was dif-
ferent from the owner of the structure, the Kohler Act transferred
the right to mine the coal at issue from the coal company (private)
to the owner of the structure (also private).68 There are good rea-
sons, however, to see Mahon as a substantive due process case ra-
ther than a regulatory takings case in the mold of contemporary
cases like Penn Central and Lucas.6 9 The Supreme Court recently
recognized in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. that the substantive
due process inquiry in early cases differs in important respects
from the contemporary regulatory takings inquiry. 0 If Mahon is
understood as a substantive due process case, then it does not
lend support for applying the Just Compensation Clause to pri-
vate-private transfers. As noted above, a private-private transfer
constitutes a "deprivation" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause, and both procedural and substantive due process con-
cepts apply to private-private transfers.
Contemporary physical invasion cases such as Nollan and
Kaiser Aetna involved a transfer of the right to exclude from pri-
vate property owners to the public.7 1 Indeed, each case involved
private property being subject to access by the public. Similarly,
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins involved access to a mall
by members of the public, and United States v. Causby involved
overflights by military airplanes.
One contemporary physical invasion case did involve a type of
private-private transfer: Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.15 Loretto involved a challenge to a New York law that
required private property owners to allow cable companies to in-
stall wiring and equipment on their property, and prohibited the
67. Id. (citing Act of May 27, 1921, 1921 Pa. Laws 1198 (codified at 52 PA. STAT. ANN.
661 (1998)).
68. See id.
69. See generally Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Juri-
sprudence'. The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 666-70 (1996); William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice
Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 816 (1998).
70. 544 U.S. 528, 540-45 (2005).
71. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1979); supra note 10 and accompanying text.
72. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 165-66.
73. 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980).
74. 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946).
75. 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
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owners from demanding compensation from the cable companies
in return.76 Unlike the other physical invasion cases discussed
above, the right to exclude in Loretto was transferred not from a
private property owner to the public generally, but was instead
transferred from private property owners to cable companies,
which are private corporations." Put another way, all of the phys-
ical invasion cases involve what effectively is the transfer of an
easement from a private property owner to another party. In
most physical invasion cases, this easement is transferred to the
public. In Loretto, it was transferred to a private corporation.
Loretto thus presents a challenge to my assertion that the Su-
preme Court's contemporary regulatory takings jurisprudence
has typically involved private-public transfers. There are a num-
ber of responses to this challenge. First, the cable companies at
issue in Loretto were public utilities, not ordinary private corpo-
rations." The distinction between private and public entities is a
permeable one, and utilities, like common carriers, enjoy some-
thing of a quasi-public status.80 For example, utilities are often
delegated the power of eminent domain.81 In this context, it is
notable that the equipment involved in Loretto was part of the
larger cable network used to serve the public as a whole. The
transfer in Loretto therefore has elements of a private-public
transfer. Similarly, in Causby, the airplane overflight case, the
outcome likely would not have changed if the overflights were by
commercial airliners rather than military planes. Although com-
mercial airlines are private entities, as common carriers they
serve the public at large, and an invasion of private property by a
common carrier can fairly be seen as an invasion by the public.
Second, it can be argued that Loretto is simply wrong on its facts,
even if its rule that regulations requiring physical invasions by
76. Id. at 423.
77. See id. at 421.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Robert D. Kamenshine, Reflections on Coerced Expression, 34 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 101, 120 (1999).
81. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 934, 974 (2003); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Open Space: Making
Way for National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (Or Not), 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
399, 408-26 (2008); Amanda R. Gaddis, Comment, Taking Away Local Control: The Risks
of Regulating a Public Utility's Eminent Domain Authority, 2 J. MARSHALL L.J. 153, 153
(2009).
82. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422.
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the public are per se takings is sound. Third, and related to the
second point, it can be argued that the Court in Loretto applied
the wrong law to its facts, and was therefore led into an incorrect
holding. I admit that it is a stretch to reconceptualize Loretto as a
substantive due process case, because its analysis is stated ex-
pressly in terms of regulatory takings concepts and cases. 3 But if
Loretto is understood as involving a private-private transfer, then
under the approach that I advocate here, it should be evaluated
under due process concepts, not takings concepts. Even under the
relatively robust substantive due process inquiry advocated by
Justice Kennedy,5 8 the law at issue in Loretto would likely have
been deemed constitutional, because the trivial impact on private
property owners was imposed by a law for the easily justifiable
purpose of allowing the cable companies to provide cable service
to the public.
This brings us to the line of recent regulatory takings cases
that most clearly involve private-private transfers. Most of the
cases in this line involved regulatory takings and due process
challenges to the retroactive imposition of monetary liability, typ-
ically in the pension context. So long as the newly imposed mone-
tary liability is owed to another private person, rather than the
government, this type of case involves a private-private transfer.
Two earlier cases in this line, Connolly v. Pension Benefit Gua-
ranty Corp. and Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California,
Inc., rejected takings claims to this type of retroactive imposition
of liability,8 5 and therefore do not provide strong support for the
application of the Just Compensation Clause to private-private
transfers.
The most recent case in this line, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,
did hold that a retroactive imposition of liability for health bene-
fits was unconstitutional.6 The Justices' positions in Apfel, how-
ever, were highly fractured, and no position commanded a majori-
ty. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the plurality applied a
regulatory takings analysis to find the imposition of liability un-
83. See id. at 426-38.
84. See discussion infra Part II.C.
85. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602, 605 (1993); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 213, 228
(1986).
86. 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (plurality opinion).
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constitutional.87 There are four reasons why Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion does not provide strong support for applying the
Just Compensation Clause to private-private transfers. First, it is
only a plurality opinion. Second, and relatedly, Justice Kennedy
dissented from the plurality's regulatory takings analysis.88 Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion did express some concern that the gov-
ernment could avoid takings liability by mandating private-
private transfers."1 As I will argue further below, however, Justice
Kennedy's positions in Stop the Beach and other cases strongly
suggest that he would address these concerns through the appli-
cation of substantive due process doctrines, not regulatory tak-
ings doctrines.9o Third, as the fragmented opinions in Apfel sug-
gest, the underlying question in these cases of whether the
imposition of monetary liability can fairly be understood as a tak-
ing remains controversial and unresolved. Fourth, Apfel was de-
cided before Lingle. In Lingle, the Court recognized that its regu-
latory takings jurisprudence had been inadvertently infected with
substantive due process concepts.91 As a result, the Court held
that the "substantially advances" test, which had appeared to be
well established in the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence,
should be rejected as an artifact of now-outdated substantive due
process doctrine.9 2 A close look at the Apfel plurality reveals that
it is based on vested rights and nonretroactivity concepts that
historically have been grounded in substantive due process, not
takings.9 3 As the Court later recognized in Lingle, it is wrong to
incorporate substantive due process concepts into the regulatory
takings analysis.94
Finally, one case in this line, United States v. Security Indus-
trial Bank, applied a regulatory takings analysis to a private-
private transfer'1 in a way that is hard to discount. Unlike Apfel,
Connolly, and Concrete Pipe, Security Industrial Bank did not in-
volve the retroactive imposition of monetary liability. Rather, it
87. Id. at 529.
88. Id. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 544.
90. See discussion infra Part II.C.
91. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 531-32 (2005) (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 540.
93. See Apfel, 524 U.S. at 533-34.
94. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540-45.
95. 459 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1982).
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involved the retroactive application of a lien avoidance statute.9 6
The retroactive termination of a lien under the statute would
have amounted to a private-private transfer of the lien interest
from the lien holder to the owner of the property subject to the
lien.97 To avoid constitutional retroactivity problems, the Court
interpreted the statute to apply only prospectively."9 Although the
Court noted that the case fit awkwardly into the regulatory tak-
ings framework, it rested its retroactivity concerns on regulatory
takings cases.99 Most important to the present issue, the Court
specifically rejected the government's argument that takings con-
cepts should not apply because the case involved a private-private
transfer rather than a private-public transfer.00 In a prior case,
Armstrong v. United States, the Court had held that the destruc-
tion of a lien on government property through the operation of so-
vereign immunity constituted a compensable taking of the lien. 0'
In Security Industrial Bank, the government attempted to
distinguish Armstrong on the ground that it was a classical "taking"
in the sense that the Government acquired for itself the property in
question, while in the instant case the Government has simply im-
posed a general economic regulation which in effect transfers the
property interest from a private creditor to a private debtor.'0 2
The Court rejected this argument in one sentence: "While the
classical taking is of the sort that the Government describes, our
cases show that takings analysis is not necessarily limited to out-
right acquisitions by the government for itself."03 In support of
this proposition, the Court cited Loretto, PruneYard, and Ma-
hon.0 4 As discussed above, these three cases provide only limited
support for the application of the Just Compensation Clause to
private-private transfers. 0 The Court's position in Security In-
dustrial Bank therefore had relatively weak precedential support,
but the case itself now provides the clearest example of the Court
96. Id. at 72-73.
97. See id. at 71-72.
98. See id. at 82 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979)).
99. Id. at 75-78.
100. Id. at 77-78.
101. 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960).
102. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 77-78.
103. Id. at 78.
104. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922)).
105. See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
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applying a regulatory takings analysis to a private-private trans-
fer.
Although its discussion is relatively explicit, Security Industri-
al Bank provides thin support for the application of the Just
Compensation Clause to private-private transfers. The Court's
cursory discussion of the subject was not well supported by
precedent. Further, the Court used the regulatory takings analy-
sis as a justification for construing the statute narrowly, rather
than as a justification for invalidating the entire statute.10 6 The
Court could have used due process-based nonretroactivity con-
cepts to reach the same point. Finally, as with the other cases in
the Apfel line, the overall thrust of the Court's opinion in Security
Industrial Bank is inconsistent with Lingle's recognition of the
importance of separating the takings and substantive due process
analyses.17 Post-Lingle, constitutional concerns about the retroac-
tive imposition of private-private transfers that historically have
been rooted in substantive due process should not be seen as a
part of the regulatory takings analysis. Understanding that this
type of retroactivity claim is the province of substantive due
process will further the significant clarification that Lingle has
brought to regulatory takings doctrine.1os
Security Industrial Bank and Loretto therefore should be seen
as the outliers in the Supreme Court's regulatory takings juri-
sprudence. The Court's regulatory takings cases-including the
iconic cases such as Penn Central and Lucas-overwhelmingly
have involved private-public transfers. The Court's case law
therefore provides very little support for applying a regulatory
takings analysis to private-private transfers, whether mandated
by the legislature, executive branch, or judiciary.
106. See Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 82 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi.,
440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979)).
107. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545, 548 (2005).
108. See id. at 543-45.
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c. There Is No Support in Justice Scalia's Plurality Opinion for
the Application of the Just Compensation Clause to Private-
Private Transfers
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Stop the Beach had a very
strong focus on private-public transfers.109 The opinion, for exam-
ple, noted that Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies closely resembled
the claimed taking in Stop the Beach, and repeatedly emphasized
the private-public transfer involved in that case.o10 The opinion
does contain two passages that, taken in isolation, might be seen
as support for the application of the Just Compensation Clause to
private-private transfers. On closer inspection, however, neither
passage in fact provides this support.
In the first of these passages, Justice Scalia wrote: "Moreover,
though the classic taking is a transfer of property to the State or
to another private party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause
applies to other state actions that achieve the same thing."111
Taken alone, the words "to another private party" might be inter-
preted as providing some support for applying the regulatory tak-
ings inquiry to private-private transfers. This sentence is the be-
ginning of a paragraph that highlights the trend in the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence of equating certain regulatory
acts to exercises of eminent domain,12 and it is true that under
Kelo v. City of New London and similar cases the government
may use eminent domain to transfer property from one private
person to another.- As discussed above, however, these exercises
of eminent domain are private-public-private, not private-private.
The paragraph closes with a sentence that emphasizes the pri-
vate-public transfer that was involved in Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies,114 and in context of the overall private-public thrust of the
109. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S _,
, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601-02 (2010) (plurality opinion).
110. See id. "States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property what was
previously private property." Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-65 (1980)). The Court in Stop the Beach
emphasized that Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies involved the recharacterization of private
funds as "public money." Id. at _ 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (citing Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam), rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)).
111. Id.at -, 130S. Ct. at2601.
112. See id. (citations omitted).
113. See 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
114. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion).
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plurality opinion, the words "to another private party" should be
taken simply as an accurate statement of the Court's post-Kelo
eminent domain jurisprudence. Further, both Justices Scalia and
Thomas dissented in Kelo,"5 and it is fair to presume that both
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would likewise be hostile
to Kelo-type uses of eminent domain. There would be a certain
level of dissonance involved with maintaining a position that Kelo
is wrong and maintaining that the regulatory takings inquiry
should apply to private-private transfers because of Kelo. This
passage from the Stop the Beach plurality opinion therefore
should not be read as support for applying principles grounded in
the Just Compensation Clause to private-private transfers.
In the second passage, Justice Scalia wrote: "If a legislature or
a court declares that what was once an established right of pri-
vate property no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less
than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its
value by regulation."116 Some of the private-private transfer sce-
narios discussed above might involve the "declar[ation] that what
was once an established right of private property no longer ex-
ists."n1 For example, the scenarios involving changes to the law of
future interests and the law of easements in one sense each de-
clared that a private property interest no longer existed.-, As dis-
cussed above, however, these scenarios do not involve the elimi-
nation of interests as interests in private property; rather, they
are better seen as involving the transfer of property interests
from one private person to another."1 Any suggestion that this
passage provides support for applying the Just Compensation
Clause to private-private transfers, however, can be refuted simp-
ly by placing the passage into its context in Justice Scalia's plu-
rality opinion:
In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking private prop-
erty without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument
of the taking. To be sure, the manner of state action may matter:
115. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). For a contrary view of the Stop the Beach plurality opinion's applicability to private-
private transfers, see Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, YALE
L.J. ONLINE 247, 258-64 (2011), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/2/18/mulvan
ey. html.
116. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
117. Id. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2602.
118. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
119. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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Condemnation by eminent domain, for example, is always a taking,
while a legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of property use
may or may not be, depending on its nature and extent. But the par-
ticular state actor is irrelevant. If a legislature or a court declares
that what was once an established right of private property no long-
er exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State had
physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by regulation. "[A]
State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public
property without compensation."12 0
Every other sentence in this paragraph is focused solely on gov-
ernment actions that result in transfers of private property to the
public. In context, the passage at issue, like the remainder of Jus-
tice Scalia's plurality opinion, should be read as being concerned
with private-public transfers, not private-private transfers.
3. Deference and Standards of Review in Judicial Takings
Claims Made Under the Just Compensation Clause
I argued above that judicial takings do not require a unique
standard different from those applied to the other branches of
government. The classic judicial takings fact pattern involves a
change in state property law. If such a change in law would have
been a taking if performed by the legislature or the executive
branch, then it should also be a taking if performed by the judi-
ciary.
The judicial takings fact pattern, however, does present some
unique issues that typically are not present in equivalent cases
involving the legislature or executive branch. If any of the
branches made an explicit change in property law, then a review-
ing federal court would have relatively little difficulty in evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of this change. If the change were impli-
cit, however, a constitutional review would require interpretation
of the state's property law. Generally speaking, this interpretive
task is the responsibility of the state courts. In reviewing an im-
plicit change in state property law, a federal court could be seen
as usurping the role of state courts as the authoritative interpre-
ters of state property law. On the other hand, taken to its logical
extreme, complete deference to the state courts' interpretive role
would allow state courts to insulate changes to property law from
120. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion) (quoting
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)).
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constitutional challenge through the simple expedient of engaging
in a creative "reinterpretation" of the prior law. As a result, fed-
eral courts must maintain an ability to evaluate for themselves
whether a state action has taken a property right, just as they
maintain an ability to evaluate the constitutionality of state court
actions in other contexts."'
Judicial takings, then, require a degree of deference that
strikes a balance between maintaining constitutional protections
of private property and respecting the role of state courts as pri-
mary interpreters of state law. In this section, I analyze the stan-
dards of deference built into both the opinion of the Court and the
plurality portions of Justice Scalia's Stop the Beach opinion. The
plurality portions of the opinion represent the high water mark of
the idea of judicial takings in the Court's takings jurisprudence to
date. The standards of deference reflected in this portion of Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion therefore provide a baseline for the likely
minimum standards of deference that would be applied if and
when a majority of the Court does fully recognize a judicial tak-
ings doctrine in the future.
The portion of Justice Scalia's opinion that represents the opi-
nion of the Court-and therefore is binding precedent-contains
two points that are important to the issue of deference. First,
state law defines private property rights.122 It therefore is not the
federal courts' place to review the wisdom of a state's property
law. Second, the property owner has the burden of showing both
that the property interest at issue existed in the first place, and
that the challenged government action eliminated that private
property interest.' 3
121. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2608 n.9. In the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia wrote
It is true that we make our own determination, without deference to
state judges, whether the challenged decision deprives the claimant of
an established property right. That is unsurprising because it is what
this Court does when determining state-court compliance with all con-
stitutional imperatives. We do not defer to the judgment of state judges
in determining whether, for example, a state-court decision has de-
prived a defendant of due process or subjected him to double jeopardy.
Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2608-09 n.9.
122. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2597 (majority opinion). "Generally speaking, state law
defines property interests . . . ." Id. (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156,
164 (1998)).
123. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2610-11.
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The plurality portion of Justice Scalia's opinion contains two
other points about deference. First, Justice Scalia noted that for a
change in law to be a taking, it must in fact be a change in the
law.124 A clarification of previously ambiguous law is not a change
in the law in this sense. 2 Second, a property right must be "es-
tablished" before its elimination can be considered a taking.126
This requirement, according to Justice Scalia, "contains within
itself a considerable degree of deference to state courts. A proper-
ty right is not established if there is doubt about its existence;
and when there is doubt we do not make our own assessment but
accept the determination of the state court."m12
Combining these points, to win a claim, a property owner has
the burden of showing that the contested government action elim-
inated a clearly established property interest. Because the burden
is on the property owner, ambiguity and indeterminacy in the
state's property law help the state and hurt the property owner. If
there is ambiguity in the existing law, and the contested court de-
cision can be seen as a clarification of this ambiguity, then the
property owner will lose. Put another way, if there is a "fair and
substantial basis" in the existing state law for the contested state
court's decision, then the property owner will lose. 28
The actual holding in Stop the Beach was very deferential to
the Florida Supreme Court, and provides a practical application
of these principles.129 The interpretation of property law articu-
lated by the Florida Supreme Court provoked strong dissents by
two Florida justices,2 0 and was contrary to the lower Florida ap-
pellate court's interpretation in the case.'m The complaining prop-
erty owners therefore at least had a colorable case to make, and
the United States Supreme Court's opinion acknowledged that
124. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2606-07 (plurality opinion).
125. See id. "If no 'settled principl[e]' has been abandoned, it is hard to see how proper-
ty law could have been 'change [d],' rather than merely clarified." Id. (alterations in origi-
nal). "A decision that clarifies property entitlements (or the lack thereof) that were pre-
viously unclear might be difficult to predict, but it does not eliminate established property
rights." Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2610.
126. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2610.
127. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2608 n.9.
128. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2608.
129. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2611-12 (majority opinion).
130. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1121
(Fla. 2008) (Wells, J., dissenting); id. at 1121-28 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
131. See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 56-60 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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"some may think the question [of the littoral property rights at
issue] close."132 The Court nonetheless rejected the property own-
ers' claim because there was a fair basis for the Florida Supreme
Court's holding in prior Florida case law. Emphasizing the role of
the claimant's burden, the Court stated:
Under petitioner's theory, because no prior Florida decision had said
that the State's filling of submerged tidal lands could have the effect
of depriving a littoral owner of contact with the water and denying
him future accretions, the Florida Supreme Court's judgment in the
present case abolished those two easements to which littoral proper-
ty owners had been entitled. This puts the burden on the wrong par-
ty. There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the
Florida Supreme Court's decision, littoral-property owners had
rights to future accretions and contact with the water superior to the
State's right to fill in its submerged land. 3
This passage is important in part because it highlights the ambi-
guity that can be present in state property law. A series of cases
might clearly establish that property owners have certain littoral
rights, but might not show that they are superior to other rights
held by the State or the public. In a related and frequently liti-
gated context, clear precedent in a state might establish that
beachfront property owners own the land down to the mean high
tide line. This precedent alone, however, might not resolve the is-
sue of whether there was a public right of access to the land im-
mediately above the mean high tide line. Reasonably well-
established public trust doctrine, for example, held that fisher-
men had a common-law right to dry their nets on the private
property above the mean high tide line.134 As a result, the well-
established private property above the mean high tide line was
subject to a limited right of the public. 13 Similarly, the mere reci-
tation in a number of cases that private property along the Great
Lakes extends to the ordinary high water line 36 might not alone
establish that there are no public rights of access to the land im-
mediately above this line. To be sure, if a prior case involving con-
tested access had established that no such public access rights ex-
isted, then the property owner's right to exclude the public would
132. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2611 (majority opinion).
133. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2610-11.
134. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 359, 365 n.7 (N.J.
1984).
135. See id. at 365-66.
136. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 73 (Mich. 2005).
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also be established. But if the prior cases involved property issues
that did not raise the issue of public access, then the exact rela-
tionship between public and private rights at this boundary
might not be established.
As a consequence, a property owner may not be able to demon-
strate that a property right is established unless prior case law in
the state has considered and rejected the competing public inter-
ests that are at issue in the later takings litigation. Many Florida
cases found that beachfront property owners had certain littoral
rights.3 7 These cases, however, were not sufficient to establish
that these littoral rights were superior to competing public rights
recognized in prior cases. The property owners in Stop the Beach
were therefore unable to show that their private property inter-
ests had been "established" in the sense that Justice Scalia used
the term.38 Even though a colorable contrary argument could be
made, the Court demonstrated deference to the Florida courts
and rejected the property owners' judicial takings claim. 39
C. Judicial Takings Under Justice Kennedy's Approach to
Substantive Due Process
The distinction between regulatory takings and substantive
due process is a matter of some dispute, but the Court's unanim-
ous decision in Lingle suggests that the two doctrines ask differ-
ent types of questions. The regulatory takings inquiry, according
to Lingle, focuses on the impact of the government action on the
property owner and asks whether that impact was the equivalent
of an exercise of eminent domain.140 Substantive due process, in
contrast, focuses more generally on the legitimacy of the govern-
ment exercise of power.141
When economic rights are at issue, courts generally apply a
substantive due process standard of review that is so deferential
the government almost always wins. 142 This state of affairs is un-
137. See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2610-12 & n.11 (majority
opinion) (citations omitted); Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medei-
ra Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
138. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2612-13 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2612.
140. See Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539-40 (2005).
141. See id. at 542.
142. Nisha Ramachandran, Realizing Judicial Substantive Due Process in Land Use
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likely to change anytime soon, in part because many of the Jus-
tices who tend to be most sympathetic to economic rights are hos-
tile to the general idea of substantive due process. 143 The contro-
versy about the use of substantive due process in other contexts
helps explain the griping about the doctrine that takes up a good
amount of Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Stop the Beach.144
Justice Kennedy is unique among the current Justices in that
he is both sympathetic to the use of substantive due process in
individual liberty contexts and sympathetic in many cases to the
protection of economic rights. Consistent with both positions, Jus-
tice Kennedy has advocated for an increased role for substantive
due process in various takings contexts, of which Stop the Beach
is only the most recent example.145
Justice Kennedy's views are of particular importance because
of his role as the swing Justice on many issues. In the judicial
takings context, property owners are not likely to win before the
current Court unless they can get Justice Kennedy's vote. In his
Stop the Beach concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
Sotomayor, expressed the view that at least some changes in
property law could be unconstitutional on substantive due process
grounds.1" Justice Kennedy's position therefore should give prop-
erty owners hope that in the right case they can garner at least
six votes for a constitutional challenge to a judicial change in
property law.
Even if they are somewhat idiosyncratic, Justice Kennedy's
views on substantive due process protection of property rights
merit special attention. In his Stop the Beach concurrence, Jus-
tice Kennedy sketched a view of substantive due process review of
Claims: The Role of Land Use Statutory Schemes, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 382-85 (2009).
143. Substantive due process, of course, is at issue in cases like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Justices Scalia and Thomas are on
the record as being hostile to the use of substantive due process in these contexts, and
Justice Scalia's critique of substantive due process in Stop the Beach, see 560 U.S. at -,
130 S. Ct. at 2604-07 (plurality opinion), should be understood in this larger context.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito might be expected to evince similar hostility. All
four justices, however, are generally sympathetic to economic rights, as the Stop the Beach
plurality opinion suggests.
144. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2604-07 (plurality opinion).
145. See, e.g., id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2614-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lingle, 544
U.S. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490-
93 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
146. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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changes in state property law that would give property interests
both broader and narrower protection than the takings analysis
presented in Justice Scalia's plurality opinion.
Justice Kennedy's substantive due process approach is broader
than the regulatory takings approach in that it more clearly ap-
plies to both private-public and private-private transactions.147 As
discussed above, private-private transactions may "deprive" own-
ers of property interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause even if they do not "take" those interests within the mean-
ing of the Just Compensation Clause.14 Justice Kennedy's posi-
tion is also broader in that it encompasses "substantial changes"
to property interests as well as the elimination of those interests:
"The Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a judicial de-
cision that eliminates or substantially changes established prop-
erty rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner, is
'arbitrary or irrational' under the Due Process Clause."149
Justice Kennedy's approach is narrower in that it recognizes a
need to maintain some flexibility for states to change their prop-
erty law. Justice Kennedy noted that "[s]tate courts generally op-
erate under a common-law tradition that allows for incremental
modifications to property law, but this 'tradition cannot justify a
carte blanche judicial authority to change property definitions
wholly free of constitutional limitations."'150 Further, because the
substantive due process approach focuses on the broad legitimacy
of the contested government action, it leaves more room for the
consideration of the government's purpose in making the change
than the regulatory takings approach, which focuses on the im-
pact of the government action on the property owner."'
147. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2613-16. One of Justice Kennedy's opinions contains
language that might be read as calling into question the distinction between private-public
and private-private transfers. In his opinion in Apfel, Justice Kennedy asserted that "the
Government ought not to have the capacity to give itself immunity from a takings claim by
the device of requiring the transfer of property from one private owner directly to anoth-
er." 524 U.S. at 544 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
Read in the context of Justice Kennedy's larger position on substantive due process, and of
Lingle's subsequent clarification of the difference between takings and substantive due
process, this passage is best taken to reflect Justice Kennedy's view that private-private
transfers should not be immune from constitutional review.
148. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
149. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted).
150. Id. (quoting Walston, supra note 21, at 435).
151. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-45 (2005).
[Vol. 45:903938
COMPLEXITIES OF JUDICIAL TAKINGS
Under Justice Kennedy's substantive due process approach,
then, reviewing courts need to identify the boundary line between
permissible "incremental modifications" and unconstitutional
"eliminat[ions] or substantial[ ] changes."152 Although this ap-
proach can be fairly criticized for its fuzziness,'-" it is possible to
identify examples of each type of change. Justice Kennedy cites a
change in property owner liability for encroachment of tree
branches as a possible example of a permissible change: "This
might be the type of incremental modification under state com-
mon law that does not violate due process, as owners may rea-
sonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain changes in
property law."5 4 At the other extreme, it is possible to come up
with a change in property law so radical that it would likely be
unconstitutional under any analysis. Imagine, for example, that a
state court held that the fee simple estate no longer existed, that
all property was held under a life estate, and that at the current
holder's death the property escheated to the state. Because this
example involves a private-public transfer, it likely would violate
the Just Compensation Clause. If the example was changed, how-
ever, so that at the current holder's death the property trans-
ferred to another private party (say, the poorest person in a par-
ticular community), then it would involve a private-private
transfer that should not implicate the Just Compensation Clause.
As modified, the change would be such an extreme departure
from our current system of property ownership that it would cer-
tainly be labeled "arbitrary" and unconstitutional on substantive
due process grounds under Justice Kennedy's approach. 5 5
In their Stop the Beach opinions, Justice Kennedy and Justice
Scalia disagreed about whether the regulatory takings or subs-
tantive due process inquiries should have priority. Justice Ken-
nedy suggested that a court should start with the substantive due
process inquiry and only proceed to the takings inquiry if subs-
tantive due process principles prove inadequate to protect proper-
ty owners.156 Justice Scalia, in contrast, argued that substantive
152. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at-, 130 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2604-07 (plurality opinion).
154. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. Justice Thomas would likely argue that the retroactive application of this change
in property law would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498, 538-39 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring).
156. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at_, 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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due process should not be applied when a more specific constitu-
tional provision, such as the Just Compensation Clause, is appli-
cable.15 Following the distinction between private-public and pri-
vate-private transfers developed above, courts should not apply
the Just Compensation Clause at all to private-private transfers.
Substantive due process therefore should offer the only avenue
for review of the substance of a government act that results in a
private-private transfer. In a case involving a private-public
transfer, Justice Scalia's argument for considering the takings
inquiry before reaching the substantive due process inquiry has
some weight. Given the unsettled state of the case law, however,
lower federal courts may have to reach both the takings and subs-
tantive due process issues in a case that presents both.
III. PROCEDURE AND REMEDIES
In this Part, I discuss procedural and remedies issues raised by
judicial takings. I begin with the procedural due process issues
that may arise in judicial takings contexts. Although these issues
involve substantive constitutional protections, they are presented
here because they are closely related to the procedural issues dis-
cussed in this Part. I then discuss three specific procedural is-
sues: the exhaustion requirements imposed by Williamson Coun-
ty, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the statute of limitations.
Finally, I discuss the remedies that may be available if a property
owner can establish that a judicial action is an unconstitutional
taking.
A. Procedural Due Process
The procedural due process ramifications of a judicially im-
posed change in the law depend on when the change is made in
the course of litigation. If the change is made in the lower state
courts, and later affirmed on appeal, then there is a good chance
that the requirements of procedural due process have been met.
The losing property owners in the lower state court presumably
would have the opportunity to challenge this change in property
law in the state appellate courts. If the property owner has had
157. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. 2606 (plurality opinion) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
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the opportunity to argue that the deprivation of property was un-
constitutional or wrong as a matter of state law, then the re-
quirements of procedural due process would have been met.
If the change is made by the state supreme court, however,
there is a good chance that procedural due process has not been
met. The most problematic scenario would involve a change to the
law made sua sponte by a state supreme court. If the state su-
preme court later denied a petition for rehearing, and the Su-
preme Court of the United States denied certiorari, then the
property owner would have been deprived of property without
any opportunity to be heard on either the decision to change the
law or on the constitutionality of the change.
Two Supreme Court of Hawaii decisions from 1973 provide
good examples of this type of deprivation of a property interest
without procedural due process. In County of Hawaii v. Sotomu-
ra, the Supreme Court of Hawaii sua sponte changed Hawaii law
to establish the vegetation line as the boundary of beachfront pri-
vate property.68 In McBryde Sugar Company v. Robinson, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii sua sponte replaced established Hawaii
water law with common law riparian rights doctrines, eliminat-
ing some traditionally recognized water rights.5 9 Constitutional
challenges were brought in federal district court to both decisions.
The district court found the McBryde Sugar decision to be un-
constitutional in Robinson v. Ariyoshi,60 although that decision
was vacated for procedural reasons that were probably erroneous
and will be discussed further below.
In Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, the district court likewise
found that the Supreme Court of Hawaii had violated the Consti-
tution.161 Unlike Robinson, however, Sotomura was not appealed,
and still remains good law. The district court noted that the Ha-
waii Supreme Court sua sponte had introduced the property own-
ership issue into the litigation.6 When the property owners peti-
tioned for rehearing, they "specifically contended that the
158. See 517 P.2d 57, 64 (Haw. 1973); Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473,
476, 477 (D. Haw. 1978).
159. See 504 P.2d 1330, 1344 (Haw. 1973); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1470
(9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986) (citing McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1344).
160. 441 F. Supp. 559, 585-86 (D. Haw. 1977), affd in part, vacated in part, 753 F.2d
1468, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
161. 460 F. Supp. at 482-83.
162. Id. at 477.
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redefinition of [the public-private boundary line] effected a taking
of their property without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and that
they were denied their constitutional right to a hearing and pres-
entation of evidence regarding that taking."6 3 The Supreme Court
of Hawaii denied the petition "without argument, evidence or
opinion," and the Supreme Court of the United States later de-
nied certiorari.164 The district court held that the Supreme Court
of Hawaii's actions deprived the owners of property without due
process of law.'6 5 Along the way, the district court reviewed the
prior Hawaii law to establish that the Supreme Court of Hawaii's
decision deprived the owners of a property right.166 The court also
held that the retroactive application of the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii's decision was an unconstitutional taking in violation of the
Just Compensation Clause as incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 161
The district court's procedural due process analysis in Sotomu-
ra is sound. If a court is going to change the law, it should give
the parties the opportunity to be heard on the issue. Procedural
due process problems like this are easy for courts to avoid-the
Supreme Court of Hawaii, for example, simply could have
granted the property owners' petition for a rehearing. If the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii had affirmed its prior decision after a re-
hearing, substantive judicial takings issues may have remained,
but the procedural due process issue would have been eliminated.
It bears repeating that many cases involving judicial changes
in property law will not have procedural due process problems.
Procedural due process issues are particularly acute when the
judicial change in law is made by a state supreme court, because
there is no nondiscretionary avenue for appeal available to the
losing property owner. 6 In contrast, when the change in law is
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 477-81.
167. See id. at 482-83.
168. Justice Kennedy's Stop the Beach concurrence mentions procedural due process in
passing, 560 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2614 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The
Due Process Clause, in both its substantive and procedural aspects, is a central limitation
upon the exercise of judicial power"), but does not discuss procedural due process doctrine
in any depth. Procedural due process is similarly neglected in Justice Scalia's opinion for
the plurality. This omission is unfortunate, because Stop the Beach would have fit the
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made by lower state courts in contexts where the losing party can
appeal as of right, disappointed property owners likely will have
had an opportunity to be heard that will satisfy procedural due
process.
B. Procedural Issues Arising From Judicial Takings Claims
Justice Kennedy emphasized the potential procedural complex-
ities of judicial takings claims in arguing that the Court should
avoid the details of a judicial takings doctrine in Stop the Beach.'9
In response, Justice Scalia dismissed these potential complexities
as "either nonexistent or insignificant."11o Justice Kennedy plainly
had the better of this exchange, and the procedural issues pre-
sented by judicial takings claims are even more complex than he
suggested they might be.
This section considers how three procedural issues may play
out in different procedural scenarios: (1) Williamson County ex-
haustion requirements; (2) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and re-
lated res judicata concerns; and (3) the statute of limitations. As
discussed in Part III, the distinction between judicial takings
claims brought by the losing state court parties and claims
brought by other property owners looms large in each of these
procedural contexts."
1. Williamson County and Exhaustion Requirements
In the 1985 Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank case, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that a regulatory takings claim was premature for two rea-
sons. First, the complaining property owners had not sought a va-
riance from a regulatory agency. Second, the property owners had
not sought compensation for the alleged taking under procedures
provided by the State.172 The requirement that the property own-
ers proceed further before bringing a takings claim implicates two
judicial takings fact pattern that most strongly implicates procedural due process if it ac-
tually had involved a deprivation of a property interest.
169. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2616-18.
170. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion).
171. See discussion infra Part III.B.
172. 473 U.S. 172, 188-94 (1985).
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related concepts: finality and administrative exhaustion.73 The
former is based on the requirement that a decision be final before
it is judicially reviewable. 7 4 The latter is based on the prudential
concern that judicial review should be delayed until a claimant
has exhausted available administrative avenues for redress."'
The portion of Williamson County that was concerned with the
property owner's failure to seek a variance is expressly based on
the issue of finality.176 The portion that was concerned with the
failure to administratively seek compensation is implicitly based
on exhaustion concerns.177 This specific compensation issue might
be of questionable direct relevance to the judicial takings context,
because it is far from clear that a compensation remedy would be
available for a judicial taking.7 In judicial takings cases where
there is an underlying legislative or executive act that would
have been a taking but for the challenged state court decision,
both a compensation remedy and state-law provided administra-
tive avenues for pursuing an award of compensation might be
available. 79 Even if a compensation remedy is not available, the
larger exhaustion concern reflected in that portion of Williamson
County may be relevant to judicial takings cases.
These finality and exhaustion requirements are based on legi-
timate and important policy concerns. It makes little sense for a
reviewing court to prematurely wade into a regulatory takings
dispute. Indeed, Penn Central, the case at the heart of the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence, would have benefited greatly
from further administrative proceedings. 80
173. See id. at 188-93.
174. See id. at 192-93.
175. See id. at 193.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 196-97.
178. See discussion infra Part III.C.
179. See discussion infra Part III.C.
180. In Penn Central, the owners of Grand Central Terminal argued that the New York
City Landmarks Preservation Commission engaged in a regulatory taking when it denied
permission to build large office towers over the terminal. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978). The owners, however, did not seek approval from the
Commission to build a smaller tower on the site. Id. at 118-19. As the Court noted in Penn
Central, the original design for the terminal included an office tower. Id. at 116-17. The
Commission might have had a hard time denying permission to build a tower consistent
with the original design of the terminal, but we will never know how they might have
ruled because the property owners went to court without any further administrative pro-
ceedings. Id. at 118-19. As a result, the Supreme Court engaged the property owner's reg-
ulatory takings claim without knowing precisely what, if anything, could be built above
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This said, there is potential for finality and exhaustion re-
quirements to be abused or manipulated to avoid review of state
actions. Indeed, concern over the perceived role of the case in fru-
strating property owners' attempts to assert potentially valid tak-
ings claims has led a number of members of the Court to call for
reconsideration of Williamson County.", In his Stop the Beach
concurrence, for example, Justice Kennedy anticipated the day
that "Williamson County is reconsidered," and dismissed the rele-
vant portions of the case as "dicta."182 Even if Williamson County
is a dead case walking, however, it still remains good law, and
lower federal courts will have to grapple with the issues that it
raises.
A good example of the potential for abuse of Williamson Coun-
ty's finality and exhaustion requirements is the tortured path of
the Robinson litigation discussed above.15 The property owners
initially won on their claim that the Supreme Court of Hawaii
had engaged in a judicial taking in the district court. 18 4 The Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed most of
the district court judgment.85 Before reaching its decisions, the
Ninth Circuit certified a series of questions to the Supreme Court
of Hawaii, which responded with a remarkably self-serving set of
answers that were plainly designed to insulate its prior decision
from constitutional challenge.86 Although the Supreme Court of
Hawaii's attempt to avoid review was rejected in the initial Ninth
Circuit opinion, it later proved successful.187 The Supreme Court
of the United States decided Williamson County while a petition
for certiorari was pending on the Ninth Circuit's initial judgment
in Robinson.18 1 The Court granted certiorari, vacated the Ninth
Circuit's judgment, and remanded for further consideration in
the terminal.
181. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.
-, -, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2618 (Kennedy, J., concurring); San Reno Hotel, L.P. v. City and
County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 348 (2005) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
182. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
183. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
184. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 580, 584-86 (D. Haw. 1977), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
185. Robinson v. Ariyoshi (Robinson 1), 753 F.2d 1468, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1985).
186. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 294-300 (Haw. 1982).
187. Compare Robinson 1, 753 F.2d at 1473-75, with Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S.
902 (1986).
188. See 477 U.S. 902.
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light of Williamson County.' 9 On remand, the district court reaf-
firmed its prior holding, and patiently explained why the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii decision at the root of the litigation had
finally resolved the property rights at issue as a matter of Hawaii
law, therefore making a judicial takings claim ripe for review.'90
The Ninth Circuit, however, accepted the contention that some
issues might be clarified with further litigation, and reversed the
district court's decision."'
The Robinson litigation illustrates the potential perils of over-
interpreting the Williamson County finality and exhaustion re-
quirements. In the decision that was the subject of the litigation,
the Supreme Court of Hawaii sua sponte changed the entire Ha-
waii law of water ownership.192 The Supreme Court of Hawaii lat-
er admitted that this ruling would be the law of the case in the
litigation and would be binding precedent on all Hawaii courts.-
On any fair reading, the Supreme Court of Hawaii's change in the
law was therefore final, and was a binding determination of the
scope of property rights in water in Hawaii. Under the United
States Supreme Court's recent administrative exhaustion juri-
sprudence, the Supreme Court of Hawaii's decision was ripe for
review.194
As a practical matter, it is hard to see what benefit would ac-
crue from forcing a litigant whose rights (or lack thereof) have
been established by a state supreme court to engage in further
proceedings in lower state courts that are bound to follow the
state supreme court's decision. In this context, there is a tre-
mendous difference between the failure to apply for a variance
that was at issue in Williamson County and the failure to engage
in further state court litigation that was at issue in Robinson. If
the variance in Williamson County had been granted, the proper-
ty owner would have had nothing to complain about. If the va-
riance had been denied, then the denial would have clarified the
exact scope of the property owner's rights. In Robinson, in con-
189. Id.
190. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002, 1004-10, 1020-21 (D. Haw. 1987), va-
cated, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989).
191. Robinson v. Ariyoshi (Robinson l), 887 F.2d 215, 216, 218-19 (9th Cir. 1989).
192. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1335, 1338-39, 1341, 1344
(Haw. 1973).
193. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d. 287, 295-99 (Haw. 1982).
194. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
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trast, the lower courts were institutionally incapable of granting
the property owner relief inconsistent with the Supreme Court of
Hawaii's decision, or of clarifying the scope of that decision.
Justice Scalia argued in Stop the Beach that Williamson Coun-
ty "would require the claimant to appeal a claimed taking by a
lower court to the state supreme court."9 5 This requirement is
eminently sensible. State supreme courts speak authoritatively
about matters of state law, and a change in the law by a lower
state court would have a good possibility of being reversed on ap-
peal. Once the state supreme court has made a decision on prop-
erty ownership, however, it makes little sense to require further,
almost certainly futile, proceedings in the state courts.
Concerns about finality and exhaustion, then, suggest that an
owner litigate in the state courts until a decision on ownership
has been made by the state supreme court, or until the owner has
exhausted the ability to appeal to the state supreme court if that
court denies discretionary review. Once this requirement has
been met, the owner should be free to bring a judicial takings
claim in the federal courts, at least as a matter of finality and ex-
haustion.
How should the finality and exhaustion requirements apply to
property owners who were not parties to the original litigation?
Justice Kennedy noted in his Stop the Beach concurrence that the
state courts are presumptively competent to hear constitutional
claims, and suggested that these property owners would also
have to pursue their claims in state court.19 6 Justice Scalia, in
contrast, suggested that these owners could bring judicial takings
claims in federal court.9 7 The answer to this question might de-
pend in part on whether or not these new property owners are
similarly situated to the owners in the original litigation. If the
new owners' factual situation is sufficiently different to raise
questions about the applicability of the contested state court deci-
sion to them, then it would make sense for the new owners to
have to litigate, at least in the first instance, in the state courts.
Factual distinctions loom large in property law, and the state
courts should have the opportunity to decide that a controversial
195. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. , _,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2609 (2010) (plurality opinion).
196. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2609-10 (plurality opinion).
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decision should not apply to a new context. Similarly, if the state
supreme court in the original litigation merely has denied discre-
tionary review, and has not yet addressed the issue on the merits,
it would make sense to require the new owners to bring their
judicial takings claim in the state courts to give the state su-
preme court the opportunity to address the issues.
If the new property owners are similarly situated to the owners
in the original litigation, however, then they should be able to
bring their claims directly in federal court. At least where the
state supreme court has issued an authoritative and binding de-
cision on the underlying property issues, it would be a tremend-
ous waste of litigant and state court resources to force the new
owners to litigate in state court. Consider, for example, the scena-
rio described above where a state supreme court redefines the
public-private boundary for beachfront property to be the vegeta-
tion line, rather than the mean high tide line. It would be futile
for beachfront property owners who were not parties to the origi-
nal action to bring their judicial takings claims in state court, be-
cause the lower state courts would be bound to follow the state
supreme court's binding precedent.
It is true, as Justice Kennedy noted, that the state courts are
presumptively competent to hear constitutional claims.18 This
presumption of competence, however, is rebutted in the judicial
takings context, because inferior state courts are institutionally
incapable of holding that a state supreme court opinion was un-
constitutional. In our hierarchal court system, inferior courts
simply are not in a position to evaluate the constitutionality of
the actions of superior courts. In a case where the new property
owners are not similarly situated to the owners in the original li-
gation, a lower court might be able to factually distinguish the
state supreme court's precedent. Where the property owners are
similarly situated, however, lower state courts would be bound by
hierarchy to follow, rather than challenge, the binding precedent
of a superior court. Property owners similarly situated to those in
the original litigation therefore should be able to bring judicial
takings claims directly to federal court.
198. See id. at 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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2. Rooker-Feldman and Res Judicata
Broadly stated, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower
federal courts from hearing "cases brought by 'state-court losers'
challenging 'state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced."' 19 In recent years, the Supreme
Court has emphasized the narrowness of the doctrine, and has
clarified that it only applies to the actual parties involved in the
state court litigation.200 Rooker-Feldman therefore clearly does not
bar consideration by the lower federal courts of judicial takings
claims brought by property owners who were not parties to the
dispute in state court.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been so narrowed that there
are reasons to doubt its continued viability.201 If it does still exist,
it is not clear that the doctrine should apply in judicial takings
cases brought by losing state court parties. The basic idea of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that losing parties in state court cas-
es should not be able to use the lower federal courts to challenge
state court judgments.202 Rather, in the typical case, the only ave-
nue for federal court review is through a petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States.201 In the typical case,
however, the losing party would be arguing that the state courts
simply got the case wrong. At least two, and often three, levels of
state courts would have heard the losing party's arguments, and
would have therefore afforded the losing party procedural due
process.
In a judicial takings case, however, the complaining property
owner is not arguing that the state courts simply decided a legal
issue incorrectly. Rather, the complaining property owner is ar-
guing that the state court violated the Constitution by taking
property without compensation. It is very troubling to think that
the only possible avenue for redress of this constitutional viola-
199. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Exxon Mobile
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
200. See id. at 464.
201. See id. at 468. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing Rooker-Feldman as having
been "finally interred'); Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 GREEN BAG 2D 317-
18 (2006) (mock obituary for the doctrine).
202. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 3.1(b), at 129-30 (8th ed.
2002).
203. Id.
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tion is a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Supreme Court certiorari petitions are rarely granted,
and under the Court's rules, error on the part of the lower court
alone typically is not enough to warrant the grant of review. 20 4
Perhaps the best case in this context for property owners would
be one in which a state supreme court sua sponte changed the
state's property law. Presuming that the court denied a subse-
quent petition for rehearing, the property owners in this scenario
would likely have been deprived of property without procedural
due process. 20 5 Rooker-Feldman is based on an interpretation of a
statute,206 and this statute should not be interpreted in a way that
deprives property owners of their constitutional right to proce-
dural due process. On the other hand, in a case where the proper-
ty owners had the opportunity to argue their judicial takings
claim before the state courts, procedural due process likely would
be satisfied. Further, in this type of case, a lower federal court re-
viewing the case would be placed in the position of second-
guessing the state court's rejection of a judicial takings claim. In
the fact pattern involving a sua sponte judicial taking by a state
supreme court, in contrast, no court had actually engaged in the
property owners' judicial takings claim.
In at least some cases, then, there are good reasons not to ap-
ply Rooker-Feldman to federal court judicial takings cases
brought by disappointed state court litigants. The Supreme Court
has recently cautioned lower courts not to overread the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, 207 and the doctrine should not be applied when
property owners have been deprived of opportunities guaranteed
by procedural due process to contest a judicial deprivation of
property.
Procedural due process concerns are also relevant to the re-
lated issue of res judicata. In his Stop the Beach plurality opinion,
Justice Scalia presumed that res judicata would preclude the
204. See id. § 4.17, at 255. The Court's rules ordinarily prevent the consideration of
claims that were not presented to the state court. Id. § 4.17, at 255-58. This bar will not
apply, however, "where the state-court decision itself is claimed to constitute a violation of
federal law." Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.
, , 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2600 n.4 (2010) (majority opinion).
205. See discussion supra Part III.A.
206. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006); Lance, 546 U.S. at 463.
207. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 464; Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 283 (2005).
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property owners who were the losing parties in the state court lit-
igation from bringing a judicial takings claim in the lower federal
courts.208 Res judicata, however, presumes that the party had an
opportunity to litigate the claim being precluded.209 In at least
some judicial takings cases, the property owners will not have
had this opportunity. As Justice Kennedy stated in his Stop the
Beach concurrence, "until the state court ... changes the law, the
party will not know if his or her property rights will have been
eliminated. So res judicata probably would not bar the party from
litigating the takings issue in [a later case] ."210 Res judicata there-
fore should only bar later litigation of a judicial takings claim
where the disappointed property owner has had a chance to liti-
gate the judicial takings issue-for example, where a lower state
court engages in a judicial taking, and the property owner has the
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of this judicial ac-
tion in appeals to higher state courts.
Whether Rooker-Feldman and res judicata bar judicial takings
claims in the lower federal courts therefore depends on the par-
ticular circumstances of the case. Neither doctrine should bar a
claim by property owners who were not litigants in the state court
proceedings. If the complaining property owner was a losing party
in the state court, and litigated the judicial takings claim during
those state court proceedings, then both doctrines may bar the
owner from bringing a later claim in the lower federal courts. If
the property owner did not have the opportunity to litigate the
judicial takings claim in state court, then neither doctrine should
bar a later claim in the lower federal courts.
3. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations for bringing a federal court judicial
takings claim should run from the time that the state supreme
court reaches a binding decision on the disputed property issue.
Even if the alleged judicial taking was performed by a lower state
court, the exhaustion and finality requirements discussed above
would likely require that the claim be litigated up to the state su-
preme court. In these circumstances, starting the statute of limi-
208. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at-, 130 S. Ct. at 2609-10 (plurality opinion).
209. See id. at _ 130 S. Ct. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
210. Id.
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tations clock for bringing a federal claim at the time of the lower
state court opinion would force property owners into bringing
premature claims to maintain their ability to assert a judicial
takings claim in federal court.
The statute of limitations should be the same for property own-
ers who were parties to the state court litigation and those who
were not. The claims of nonlitigant property owners would be-
come ripe as soon as the state court issued a binding opinion tak-
ing property. For example, if a state supreme court issued a bind-
ing opinion redefining the beachfront property boundary from the
mean high tide line to the vegetation line, then that opinion
would immediately take the property of nonlitigant property
owners by changing the state's law of property.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Stop the Beach contains
language that seemingly would support claims by property own-
ers who were not parties to the state court litigation even years or
decades after the state court reached its decision changing the
law.2" In the context of discussing the substantive standard for
judicial takings, Justice Scalia wrote:
[A] judicial elimination of established private-property rights that is
foreshadowed by dicta or even by holdings years in advance is none-
theless a taking. If, for example, a state court held in one case, to
which the complaining property owner was not a party, that it had
the power to limit the acreage of privately owned real estate to 100
acres, and then, in a second case, applied that principle to declare
the complainant's 101st acre to be public property, the State would
have taken an acre from the complainant even though the decision
was predicable.2 12
This passage is problematic in several respects. First, if either
dicta or holdings in prior case law "foreshadow" that a property
interest might not exist, then it is hard to see how that interest
could be "established" as a matter of state law. Put another way,
the existence of this foreshadowing in the prior case law would
likely undercut the property owners' ability to meet their burden
of proving that they had a property right to begin with, and that
there was not a fair and substantial basis in the prior law for the
contested state court holding.
211. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2609-10 (plurality opinion).
212. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2610.
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Second, Justice Scalia's example suggests that there is no time
limit whatsoever on property owners' judicial takings claims. If a
state court has held "years in advance" that a property interest
does not exist, property owners should not be able to manufacture
judicial takings claims by bringing state court cases seeking to
assert these long-abolished property interests. Justice Scalia may
have wished to keep open the possibility of claims by property
owners contesting past state court opinions as in Stevens v. Can-
non Beach, where he dissented from the denial of certiorari on
judicial takings grounds.2 13 If this is what Justice Scalia intended
this passage to mean, then by his logic property owners could
bring judicial takings challenges to changes in property law dat-
ing to the founding of the United States of America. The statute
of limitations and the related equitable doctrine of laches, howev-
er, exist to bar stale claims and settle the law. These rules should
similarly bar late claims by property owners in judicial takings
cases, just as they bar late claims by property owners claiming
takings by the legislature or executive branch.
C. Remedies for Judicial Takings
Two types of remedies might be available for a taking that is
not the result of an affirmative exercise of eminent domain. First,
a court could declare the contested government action unconstitu-
tional. In certain circumstances, this declaration could be accom-
panied by an injunction against enforcement of government ac-
tion.214 This type of remedy can be labeled as "invalidation" of the
government action.15 As a result of this invalidation, the con-
tested government action is rendered ineffective, and any affected
private property interests are reestablished to their original
state.2 16 Second, a court could award compensation to the com-
213. See Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1214 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Michael C. Blumm & Elizabeth B. Dawson, The Florida Beach
Case and the Road to Judicial Takings, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y L. REV. (forth-
coming) (manuscript at 30-33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr
actjid=1669707 (explaining that in Cannon Beach, Justice Scalia suggested that the prop-
erty owners should be able to bring a constitutional challenge because they had not been
parties to a case that arguably had changed the law roughly two decades previously).
214. See Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 477 (D. Haw. 1978); Robin-
son 1, 753 F.2d 1468, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
215. See Kamaole Pointe Dev. LP v. County of Maui, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1371 (D.
Haw. 2008).
216. See Sotomura, 460 F. Supp. at 483.
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plaining property owner."' With this type of remedy, typically la-
beled "inverse condemnation," the property interests at issue are
transferred to the public in return for compensation.218 The con-
tested government action is made valid by the payment of com-
pensation.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that inverse con-
demnation, to the extent that it is available at all, can only be
had in a case involving a taking under the Just Compensation
Clause.219 It should not be available for cases seeking redress for
deprivations of property in violation of substantive or procedural
due process. 2 20 The theory of inverse condemnation is that the
government action is the equivalent of an exercise of eminent
domain, and therefore should be accompanied by just compensa-
tion.2 ' Substantive and procedural due process cases may include
a broader range of injuries to property,22 2 and because they are
based on the Due Process Clause, they do not directly implicate
the compensation requirement of the Just Compensation Clause.
Both Sotomura and Robinson were examples of due process cases,
and in each case the aggrieved property owners obtained invali-
dation relief.223
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on remedies for govern-
ment actions that do not involve explicit exercises of eminent do-
main, but nonetheless violate the Just Compensation Clause, is
somewhat confused. For many years, invalidation was the pre-
sumed remedy for a regulatory taking,224 and it was an open ques-
tion as to whether a winning property owner could pursue an in-
verse condemnation remedy.12 5 The Supreme Court finally
established in the 1987 First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles case that the inverse
217. See Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933).
218. Fountain v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1043 (11th Cir.
1982).
219. See id.
220. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 638 (2000).
221. Fountain, 678 F.2d at 1043.
222. See discussion supra Parts II.C. and III.A.
223. See Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 477 (D. Haw. 1978); Robin-
son I, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
224. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 628 (1981);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 259 (1980).
225. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 310 (1987).
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condemnation remedy was available to property owners. 226 The
exact circumstances in which a winning property owner can get
each remedy remains somewhat open. This already clouded re-
medies picture was made even less clear by the Court's 1984 hold-
ing in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. that equitable relief cannot
be awarded in a regulatory takings case where the property own-
er can bring a suit for compensation against the government."2
The opinions in Stop the Beach reflect the prevailing uncertain-
ty over remedies available in non-eminent domain takings cases.
Justice Kennedy, citing Ruckelshaus, wrote that "[i]t appears un-
der our precedents that a party who suffers a taking is only en-
titled to damages, not equitable relief."228 In response, Justice Sca-
lia's plurality opinion asserted that the compensation "remedy is
even rare for a legislative or executive taking," and suggested
that invalidation is the default remedy.229 Justices Kennedy and
Scalia, then, appeared to differ on the fundamentals of the reme-
dies generally available in non-eminent domain takings. Justice
Kennedy asserted that only compensation is available, while Jus-
tice Scalia asserted that the typical remedy is invalidation, with
compensation being available only as a relatively rare exception.
Justice Scalia had the better argument on this issue. A long
line of regulatory takings cases have applied or presumed the
availability of an invalidation remedy. 230 The only case law sup-
port that Justice Kennedy offered for his position is Ruckelshaus,
which, on close examination, is far narrower than Justice Kenne-
dy suggested. In that case, Monsanto sought an injunction
against the application of a federal statute that required the dis-
closure of its trade secrets .23 The Supreme Court held that the
federal statute took Monsanto's trade secrets, but also held that
Monsanto was not entitled to an injunction because it could sue
for damages under the Tucker Act. 232 This holding highlights
three factors that distinguish Ruckelshaus from many regulatory
226. Id. at 321-22.
227. 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984).
228. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.., ,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2617 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
229. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion).
230. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 628 (1981); see Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 259 (1980).
231. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 990.
232. Id. at 1016.
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takings cases. First, in defending the lawsuit, the government ar-
gued against the invalidation remedy and for the compensation
remedy.233 This turned the typical remedy dynamic on its head-
in the typical case, the property owner seeks compensation and
the government seeks invalidation to avoid monetary liability. 3 4
Second, Monsanto expressly sought an injunction, rather than
simply seeking a declaration of invalidity.235 In many regulatory
takings circumstances, the government is unlikely to try to act
under a statute that has been declared unconstitutional, and a
simple declaration of invalidity on constitutional grounds will re-
solve matters. Third, because Monsanto expressly sought an in-
junction, the familiar rule that injunctive relief is not available
when a party can obtain adequate monetary relief came into
play.236 The Court held that the Tucker Act provided an avenue to
seek compensation and so denied injunctive relief.23 In many
state law regulatory takings scenarios, the availability of a statu-
tory basis for monetary relief may not be so clear.
The Court's case law, therefore, is best read as reflecting sup-
port for both invalidation and compensation remedies in legisla-
tive and executive takings cases that do not involve eminent do-
main, although the circumstances in which each remedy might be
available remains opaque. At the least, the Court's case law
should not be read as establishing compensation as the exclusive
remedy for property owners who have suffered a non-eminent
domain taking.
Further, there are good arguments for being cautious in allow-
ing a compensation remedy, particularly in judicial takings cases.
The invalidation remedy negates the original governmental ac-
tion, and gives the government actors two choices on how to pro-
ceed. Either the government can abandon its original objective, or
it can use an exercise of eminent domain to take the property
rights at issue in return for compensation so it can proceed with
the original objective.23 8 Depriving the government of this choice
233. Id. at 998-99.
234. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 310 (1987); San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 450 U.S. at 628; Agins, 447
U.S. at 259.
235. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 998.
236. Id. at 1019.
237. Id. at 1016.
238. Even if the government acquiesces to the invalidity and abandons its original ob-
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by allowing a compensation remedy may force substantial and
unexpected monetary liability on the public. In a legislative or
executive takings case, the government may be able to mitigate
this liability by agreeing not to apply the contested government
action to other property owners who were not parties to the origi-
nal case. For example, if a legislative act is held to be a taking
and compensation is awarded, the legislature may be able to insu-
late the State from further liability to other property owners by
repealing the act. The judiciary, in contrast, cannot easily change
course, because its opportunities to act are limited by the cases
that come before it. For example, if a state supreme court decision
was held to be a taking and compensation was awarded, that
court would have to wait until it was presented with a later case
to overrule its prior decision. If constitutional challenges to the
original case are allowed to be brought in federal court, then the
state supreme court might never be presented with the opportu-
nity to reconsider its original decision.
Justice Scalia's position that invalidation is the default remedy
in judicial takings cases therefore seems to be superior to Justice
Kennedy's position that compensation is the default remedy.
Even if compensation is eliminated as an option, however, the
judicial takings remedies issue remains highly complex. Justice
Scalia dismissed Justice Kennedy's concerns about remedies by
asserting that "[i]f we were to hold that the Florida Supreme
Court had effected an uncompensated taking in the present case,
we would simply reverse the Florida Supreme Court's judgment
that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act can be applied to the
property in question."219 The remedy in Stop the Beach, then,
would have been a type of invalidation-reversal of the state su-
preme court's judgment. This remedy would work in a judicial
takings case brought by way of a petition for certiorari to the Su-
preme Court of the United States.
The picture is more complex, however, if a judicial takings case
is brought in the lower federal courts. In this type of case, a prop-
erty owner would contest a state court decision by bringing a law-
suit in federal district court. In the certiorari scenario, the state
jective, there remains the possibility that it incurred temporary takings liability for the
time between the original act and the declaration of invalidity. See First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 310.
239. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2607 (2010) (plurality opinion).
2011] 957
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
court decision at issue is before the federal court as a matter of
appellate procedure. In the district court scenario, the state court
decision would be challenged as an unconstitutional government
act. The district court would therefore be sitting in judgment of
the state supreme court. This is an odd, though not unprecedent-
ed, position for a federal district court to find itself in.
The federal district court's position might initially seem to be
more straightforward in a case where there is an underlying leg-
islative or executive action that would have been a taking but for
the state court decision holding that the property rights at issue
did not exist.2 40 In this type of case, the federal district court could
hold that the legislative or executive act was unconstitutional.
The invalidation of this government act alone, however, would
not give the property owner full redress, because the judicial act
that upheld the legislative or executive act also took property.
Take, for example, the scenario involving a legislative act that
redefined the beachfront property line from the mean high tide
line to the vegetation line. The state supreme court later upheld
the statute on the ground that the property line as a matter of
common law was located at the vegetation line, not the mean high
tide line. Presume that the prior state law had clearly established
the property line at the mean high tide line, and that this judicial
decision therefore amounted to a clear change in the law. In this
scenario, a federal district court could not give the property own-
ers full redress simply by holding that the legislative act was un-
constitutional, because the judicial action would, standing alone,
eliminate the private property interests at issue. Even in a case
involving an underlying legislative or executive act, therefore, the
lower federal court would have to review the constitutionality of
the state court decision.
IV. RECOGNIZING A JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE WILL
NOT RESULT IN FEDERAL COURT REVIEW OF ALL STATE COURT
PROPERTY DECISIONS
A concern that has been raised about recognizing a doctrine of
judicial takings is that it would result in a flood of federal court
challenges to state court decisions. As Justice Breyer noted in his
Stop the Beach concurrence:
240. See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
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Property owners litigate many thousands of cases involving state
property law in state courts each year. Each state-court property de-
cision may further affect numerous nonparty property owners as
well. Losing parties in many state-court cases may well believe that
erroneous judicial decisions have deprived them of property rights
they previously held and may consequently bring federal takings
claims.2 4 '
As Justice Breyer noted, the federal courts might not only become
the courts of last resort for state court property disputes, but
might also become a forum for challenges to state court decisions
by property owners who were not parties to the original litiga-
tion.242 Further, if cases that affect property ownership but that
do not directly involve property law are included, such as the sce-
nario involving a change in contracts law discussed above,'4 3 then
the scope of the potential problem may be even greater than Jus-
tice Breyer suggested.
If, as I argue above, the scope of the Just Compensation Clause
is properly limited to government actions that result in private-
public transfers, this prudential concern largely disappears.
Compared to the number of cases that involve property ownership
generally, the number of cases that involve purported private-
public transfers is small. Only a relatively small number of these
private-public cases would support colorable judicial takings
claims.244 While cases involving private-private transfers might be
subject to review in federal court on substantive or procedural
due process grounds, the standards applicable in those contexts
are sufficiently deferential to discourage an inordinate amount of
litigation.245 Finally, the procedural hurdles discussed above will
provide a further impediment to property owners who seek to
bring judicial takings claims in federal court.246 As a result, judi-
cial takings claims are likely to be brought in federal court, but
these claims are unlikely to grow into an unmanageable flood.
241. See Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at-, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring).
242. See discussion supra Part I.A.2. (discussing challenges by nonparties to the origi-
nal litigation).
243. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
244. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
245. See discussion supra Parts II.C. and III.A.
246. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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V. CONCLUSION
Stop the Beach dramatically raised the profile of judicial tak-
ings, but left all of the important issues open. I have argued that
these issues are remarkably complex, and their resolution de-
pends, in part, on three factual distinctions between types of cas-
es. The first distinction, between cases involving private-public
transfers and cases involving private-private transfers, is impor-
tant to the substantive issue of whether a judicial action has vi-
olated the Constitution. So long as claims under the Just Com-
pensation Clause are limited to private-public transfers, judicial
takings scenarios fit well within the Court's existing regulatory
takings jurisprudence. Indeed, judicial takings claims can be re-
solved under existing takings tests, and there is no need to create
a standard specific to judicial takings scenarios.
The second distinction is between cases brought by losing state
court litigants and cases brought by other similarly situated
property owners. The third distinction is between cases where
there is an underlying legislative or executive action and cases
where the judiciary acts unilaterally. These two distinctions mat-
ter a great deal to procedural and remedies issues. The critical
preliminary question of whether a complaining property owner
can even bring a claim in federal court may turn on one or both of
these distinctions.
The complexities of the judicial takings issues demonstrate the
wisdom of approaching constitutional issues carefully and nar-
rowly. As judicial takings litigation progresses in the aftermath of
Stop the Beach, courts should be careful to resolve only the issues
before them, and be mindful of the distinctions between different
types of cases.
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